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VigiSanfism in international Relations: Kubaikowa,
Cryickshank and Marxist theory
FRED HALLIDAY
Over the past few years Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank have produced
a substantial and wide-ranging oeuvre on the issue of Marxism and international
relations. Their first work, Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International
Relations, published in. 1980, stressed the importance of engagement between these
two bodies of thought, and this theme is restated in a more composed manner in their
later Marxism and International Relations.1 The themes of these books have been
reiterated in article forms and most recently in their essay "The 'New Cold War* in
'critical International Relations studies'9' (in the July 1986 number of this Review).
There is much that is disputable in their writings and their recent essay on the new
cold war is no exception: but, before turning to some debatable aspects of their
interpretation of the debate on the New Cold War, it may be worth emphasizing the
points of more general value in their work.
The systematic recognition of Marxist theory
First, Kubalkova and Cruickshank break with what had hitherto been the
predominant mode of treatment of Marxism within International Relations—namely
that of dismissal and caricature, often a bland ignoring of its arguments, often too a
slipshod simplification.2 This treatment reflected many factors—a shared, Anglo™
American, rejection of Marxism; the cold war climate in which the subject of Inter-
national Relations developed as an academic discipline after the Second World War;
the silences about Marxism of conventional political science and economics upon
which much International Relations drew; the institutional pressures of a discipline
often concerned with a rather narrowly interpreted set of methodological questions;
the delimiting preferences of funders and official sponsors. Whatever the reasons for
this treatment, the result was that most textbooks and discussions of International
Relations could afford to relegate or suppress Marxism altogether. The recent
discussion of dependency theory confined Marxism to a specific, north-south
enclave. Kubalkova and Cruickshank break with this tradition, in that they give
Marxism systematic recognition.
A second merit of their work is the attention they pay to Soviet writings on inter-
national relations. The weaknesses of nearly all Soviet writings on social sciences
published in the west are well known: they tend to be dogmatic, wooden, repetitive.
This is as true in the field of International Relations as it is in other branches of the
social sciences.3 But such a characterization is, in itself, insufficient. Soviet writings
also have strengths that are too easily dismissed: a stress on structural and class
factors in international relations and an, at times, welcome scepticism about what
happens to be the fashion in western academic circles. Both for its intellectual content
and for its persistent, if mediate, relation to Soviet policy, this body of work on inter-
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national relations merits the kind of attention given to it by Kubalkova and
Cruickshank. In a number of other branches of the social sciences a parallel recent re-
assessment of Soviet writings, at once appreciative and critical, can be noted:
Rozman's work on Soviet writings about modern China and Gellner's on Soviet
anthropology are cases in point.4
The third merit of the writing of Kubalkova and Cruickshank is their stress on the
mutual weaknesses of conventional International Relations and Marxism: it is not a
question of arguing that one 'needs' the other, or that one contains a convincing
refutation, or vindication, of the other. Rather, with their overlapping concerns and
theoretical objects, Marxism and International Relations have much to learn from
each other: with the recognition of their distinctiveness and their respective lacunae,
theirs can and should be a fruitful encounter. If Marxism has underestimated the
salience of the national state, international relations has been rather too coy about
the nature and very name of the international system that has provided its raison
d'etre, namely capitalism. This side of the theoretical endeavour of Kubalkova and
Cruickshank is, as far as it goes, to be welcomed.
Contentious features
Recognition of these strengths need not, however, obscure discussion of other more
contentious features of their work, ones that significantly weaken the validity of their
writing and the strength of their arguments. There are four major problems with their
work. In the first place, while their declared goal is to study the relationship between
Marxism and international relations, Kubalkova and Cruickshank appear to allot very
little importance to what Marx and Engels actually said that may be relevant to the
subject. Their claim in their second work that 'international relations did not particu-
larly interest the founders of Marxism5 (p. 27) is one of the most extraordinary that
they make. In fact, Marx and Engels had a great deal to say both about the inter-
national relations of their time and about a range of general issues central to the
discipline (such as war, nationalism, and diplomacy). It is, perhaps, not wholly
casual that in none of their writings do Kubalkova and Cruickshank appear to
acknowledge the existence of another book on the same topic as theirs, one that does
give close attention to what Marx and Engels said and which deploys a rather wider
range of textual and historical erudition than they can, as yet, muster.5
This constitutive eclipse in their analysis leads on to a second absence in their work,
namely discussion of the relevance of Marxist theory as such to the discussion of the
central concepts of international relations: the state, the economy, and the
determinants of international relations. Marx and Engels established a theoretical
system, based upon the determination of the socio-economic and the centrality of
class conflict, that is of great importance for international relations as a whole. The
potential relevance of Marxism, with all its aberrations and silences, lies in this
theoretical and methodological scope, rather than in the particular observations
about mternational relations or the vapidities of the dialectic that Kubalkova and
Cruickshank have culled from their authors.
The third problem with Kubalkova and Cruickshank concerns their attitude to
non-Soviet Marxism. They allow the fact that they extensively discuss Soviet writings
on international relations, positive in itself, to obscure independent and anterior
traditions of non-Soviet Marxism in central and western Europe. The implication of
much of their writing is that Soviet Marxism is the main body of Marxist writing
today, and that other brands of Marxism are in some way tributary or dependent
upon it. Not only is this both historically and theoretically inaccurate, but it also
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serves the purpose of associating non-Soviet Marxists closely with the USSR. And
this association is one that is material to the fourth major problem in their writings,
namely what can be termed its vigilantist orientation. This includes elisions of
argument, dubious imputations of motive, foreshortenings of logic. While
Kubalkova and Cruickshank seek to open a debate, they also seem interested in
defining the terms of this debate in a manner most suitable to them. They admit
Marxism to the debate, but deny much Marxist writing a legitimate place in the
overall discussion of International Relations. This failing is noticeable indeed in their
recent essay on the 'New Cold War' and is such as to prompt the term 'vigilantism':
this denotes the ambivalent character of their work, one of simultaneous recognition
and control, a patrolling of the field of International Relations in order to identify
and, where necessary, apprehend theorists of whom they disapprove. Kubalkova and
Cruickshank can be both dense and meandering; it is not always easy to discern what
they mean to say. The central message of their assessment of the 'New Cold War'
writings does, however, come through loud and clear: they do not like them. With
equal justice it can be suggested that they do not understand them either.
The 'revisionists', they at various points say, are 'inexpert', 'disingenuous',
'ethnocentric' and 'theoretically confused'. Four issues, in particular, underlie
Kubalkova and Cruickshank's assessment of Marxist and revisionist writings on the
New Cold War: (i) the identification of a distinct school of writings on International
Relations, variously described by them as 'revisionist', 'critical', 'Left'; (ii) the
concentration on the issue of 'responsibility' of east and west as central to the
discussion; (iii) a presumption of the established primacy of International Relations
in regard to discussion of inter-state conflict and the broader pattern of international
relations; (iv) a concealed homology of Western Marxist and Soviet writing on the
new cold war.
A 'critical' school?
As already noted, Kubalkova and Cruickshank begin their article by identifying a
new body of writing in International Relations, to which they variously apply the
terms 'critical', 'revisionist' and 'Left'. This identification they conjoin with random
reflections, and disparagements, of the generation of cold war revisionist historians
of the 1960s and of earlier schools of Marxism. That there is such a new body of
thought on the cold war is certainly true: but the manner in which Kubalkova and
Cruickshank define it is misleading, and significantly so, since it confuses the basic
arguments underlying the writing of this school.
In the first place, the terms Kubalkova and Cruickshank apply are tendentious. To
use the term 'critical' of Marxist writings on the cold war implies an identification
with a particular brand of Marxism that appears to bear little relation to the body of
work under discussion. Kubalkova and Cruickshank discuss the provenance of the
term 'critical' but they make little sense of it. Critical theory, in its precise sense, is the
theory of the Frankfurt School—of Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, Horkheimer and
Habermas. The term 'critical' is a development of the original Hegelian idea of a
theoretical engagement with, and transcendence of, an already established set of
ideas: it is in its most basic sense designed to contrast this critical body of theory,
which denies facticity, i.e. the legitimacy and eternality of the given, with what it sees
as the 'positivist' approach of those who accept the world as it is, and accept what is
as what should be.6 The critical theory of the Frankfurt School has had an influence
on some branches of social science—on sociology and philosophy, to name but two.
It has had its forays into psychoanalysis, and literature. It has had virtually no impact
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on International Relations, and the founders of the Frankfurt School have had
nothing substantial to say about International Relations. The classical international
concerns of Marxism—the internationalization of capital, imperialism, revolution—
are alien to the Frankfurt School with its more strictly philosophical and social
concerns.7 For a 'critical' school of International Relations to emerge, it would have
to be one that ranged itself as a negating, transcending, challenge to the positivist
inclinations of existing theory. It could 'negate' the state, war, sovereignty, the inter-
national economy. It might look askance at the positivist penchant of decision-
making analysis. Peace Studies might be a candidate for such a categorization, and
such comprehensive challenges as those of Charles Beitz, John Burton or Richard
Falk might be considered cognate negations, even if on very different theoretical
foundations. But the term 'critical' is misleading, as much about critical theory itself
as about the origins and concerns of the 'New Cold War' school. Equally misleading
is the term 'revisionist' as applied by Kubalkova and Cruickshank.
In answer to the question as to who started the 'New' Cold War and who is
responsible for its continuation there is not much difference in the findings of
the contemporary Left on the one hand and the US Cold War revisionists on the
other.8
The link Kubalkova and Cruickshank seek to establish between the earlier revisionist
historians of the 1960s and the new cold war writings of the 1980s appears sufficient,
in their line of argument, to discredit the latter. Since the first revisionists were
dismissed by orthodox historians as 'unacademic' and were seen as apologists for the
USSR, the same is, by implication, valid for the second generation.
There is, on closer examination, only a limited similarity between the two bodies of
thought beyond the fact that both reject an established orthodoxy within the western
world. Historically, the revisionists—the Kolkos, Appleman Williams, Horowitz-
were, as the name implies, a group who rejected an established position, in their case
within history. They 'revised' orthodox views on the origins of the cold war. In the
case of writers on the New Cold War there was as yet little established history to
revise. Prejudices about the New Cold War abounded but in many ways the Marxist
and related writers got there first: an established orthodox school had not yet
emerged. One cannot be 'revisionist' when there is nothing to revise. Secondly, the
charge made against the first revisionists, that they placed all the blame on the United
States and none on the Soviet Union, irrelevant as it was to assessing the
documentary and explanatory validity of their analysis, is simply inapplicable to the
writers on the New Cold War. Kubalkova and Cruickshank lay a special stress on this
question since it is central to their whole argument that the writers on the New Cold
War are but Soviet apologists. To support this they have to shift the argument from
being about a similar analysis of world politics (in the case of the earlier revisionists)
to one about similar methodologies (supposedly true of the second). But the
argument and intent are the same, and in both cases wrong. None of the New Cold
War authors Kubalkova and Cruickshank discuss fits the stereotype of the revisionist
historians: all are critical of the USSR, and all ascribe responsibility for Cold War II,
in part, to the Soviet Union. My own book, for example, has a chapter devoted to the
internal 'involution' of the USSR in the Brezhnev period, and the role this trajectory,
epitomized in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, played in discrediting the possibility of
any alternative. Equally, it documents and criticizes the manner in which the USSR
contributed to the arms race by rivalling the United States. In my Cold War book,
and elsewhere, I have argued against the image of the USSR as a docile, passive,
innocent element in world politics. What I, and others, have at the same time tried to
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do is to assess and, where appropriate, • reject the conventional image of Soviet
expansionism purveyed in the West. Such an evaluation is rather different from that
which Kubalkova and Cruickshank ascribe to the earlier "revisionists5.
Most importantly of all, however, is the difference between what the two
'revisionist' schools are concerned to analyse. The revisionists were, in the first
instance historians, concerned to present an alternative, more accurate, narrative and
interpretation of events. The writers on the New Cold War are concerned to analyse
the 1970s, but they are doing something more: they are concerned with theoretical
issues too. They discuss a set of issues about historical agency and levels of
determination in international relations, questions that are absent from the work of
the supposedly antecedent historians. It is this, above all, which distinguishes writers
on the New Cold War from the revisionist historians.
These misidentifications of the New Cold War writers are important, not just
because they mislead about origins and antecedents, but also because they serve to
establish the coherence of the school on bases quite other than those which have
applied. The unity of the New Cold War writers is not given by the analytic positions
they adopt about what happened in 1979 or whatever. Herein lies the misleading
focus of Kubalkova and Cruickshank. Their account of the New Cold War school is
inaccurate in, among other things, its great overstatement of the analytic homo-
geneity of this school. Thus on the issue of analysing the arms race, the debate ranges
from the determinist theory of Thompson's 'exterminism5 to the moderated class
agency espoused by Mike Davis and myself. On the issue of the USSR, all writers are
critical of the Soviet Union but for different reasons: Chomsky with his image of the
'two dungeons', and Mary Kaldor with her stress on military production as
determinant have quite contrasted views. Most importantly of all, there is the
protracted dispute about what the main source of international tension is—some
locating it in the conflicts within the western states (Kaldor, Frank), others in the
need to maintain internal order within the blocs (Chomsky), others in the rivalry of
the blocs themselves (Halliday).
If Kubalkova and Cruickshank try to establish the existence of a school on the
basis of positions about history, or analytic conclusions, they can only do so by
greatly simplifying the debates and ascribing a unity where none exists. It is not here
that the unity of the school may be found: rather it resides in something they only
glancingly refer to, namely in the theoretical issues, substantive and methodological,
that these writers raise.
The focus of debate
From a reading of Kubalkova and Cruickshank it would appear that the main issue
of debate is the role of the USSR in world politics.9 This is what the New Cold War
writers are concerned to legitimate, or disguise, and it is here that the greatest concern
by all right-thinking International Relations professionals should be exercised. This
question of the USSR is indeed important: but there is as already indicated, no
unified position about it. Moreover the analysis of the USSR takes place within a
broader set of arguments that readers of Kubalkova and Cruickshank could hardly
divine. Three of these are of special prominence within the debate on the New Cold
War and bring us somewhat nearer the substance of the discussion than Kubalkova
and Cruickshank would enable us to do. These three issues are: (a) the question of
agency in international relations, and specifically the question of agency in regard to
the arms race; (b) the relationship between peace and socialism; (c) the salience of
east-west conflict.
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Agency
The current round of debate on the New Cold War began with E. P. Thompson's
1980 essay on exterminism, an article in which Thompson not only drew attention to
the dangers of nuclear war but suggested an analysis of why this danger was
growing.10 The core of his thesis was that the arms race, and the attendant inter-state
conflicts of the post-war period, had acquired a momentum of their own, beyond the
control of individual politicians or governments. A monstrous and potentially
destructive force had been unleashed against which an extreme exertion of popular
mobilization and political will had to be directed. Thompson rejected the very
question of who, the United States or the Soviet Union, had started the cold war. The
question of origin, so central to the early orthodox revisionist debate, was simply
irrelevant. He saw the Soviet Union and United States as locked today in an iso-
morphic conflict, in which each fed on the exterminism of the other. In the face of
this dramatic analysis, one that combined a degree of responsibility and urgency
better meriting the term 'realism' than much of the doleful complacency normally
denoted by that term, a wide-ranging debate took place. Some writers agreed with
Thompson and indeed took his analysis even further, arguing that 'exterminism' was
not merely inherent in the post-1945 nuclear arms race, but was a deep, historically
constituted, dynamic within western civilization as a whole. For such writers,
epitomized by Rudolf Bahro, the only solution was a rejection of industrial civiliza-
tion itself, a total ecological and spiritual transformation, that would reject modern
society as a whole, together with its nuclear weapons.11 For others, however,
Raymond Williams, Mike Davis and myself included, Thompson had conceded too
much to the impersonal, structurally determined, implications of his concept. The
arms race, like all social and political activity, resulted in events that were not
foreseen or desired by their originators: but, for all its annihilating potential, it bore a
mediate relation to rational intent and to other, non-exterministic, and somewhat
familiar, political concerns.12
Peace and socialism
The classical Marxist position, enunciated most clearly by Lenin in his writings on
imperialism and the First World War, was that the struggle for peace and for
socialism were necessarily interlocked.13 Since war was a product of capitalist
rivalries, only the abolition of capitalism could ensure the passing of war. In the
post-1945 period, and in particular with the advent of nuclear weapons, this position
has been altered and revised. The Soviet position has accepted that nuclear war is not
inevitable, even if wars of national liberation remain so. China, which initially
opposed the Soviets for their 'revisionism5 on this issue, has now also accepted this
position, and has apologized for its earlier insouciant attitude to nuclear weapons.
The position of the western peace movement has been related to, but distinct from,
this debate within the communist movement. Communist parties have long been
champions of 'peace5, even at the risk of demeaning this value by investing it with a
partisan pro-Soviet import. This was true in the first post-war peace movement of the
early 1950s, the second of the early 1960s and the third, that of the 1980s. The
position that Thompson and many others in the peace movement have adopted
provides a similar analysis, albeit one drawn from very different assumptions. Their
starting point has been the need to rally all human subjects in defence of common
goals, in this case the saving of humanity from extinction. Their appeals to the
population as a whole, and their analysis of the threat of war imply that a politics of
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peace, including governments committed to abolition of the arms race, are possible
on a broad trans-class basis. Similarly, appeals for a neutral or independent Europe,
separate from both the Soviet and American blocs, presuppose that such a goal is
attainable within the existing political and social systems. Put more directly,
capitalist states, and specifically a capitalist Europe, can fulfil the function of
ensuring peace.
Thompson's arguments, and populist extensions of it as in the German Green
Party, have been subjected to considerable challenge and debate. Thompson's critics
do not argue that nuclear war is inevitable, let alone desirable. What they do argue is
that the central Leninist thesis remains valid: that the danger of nuclear war will
remain until socialism has been established. There can be no quick or easy solution to
the problem of nuclear weapons: the mass movements of the 1980s, well-intentioned
as they are, are doomed to failure, since they fail to confront the social, class,
interests underlying the arms race and its attendant ideologies in the capitalist
countries. This line of analysis locates the sources of the arms race not in an
abstracted exterminism, or in the covenient automaticities of the balance of power,
but in identifiable social forces within the industrialized countries. As Mandel put it,
the disagreement with the peace movement is not that the latter has overstated the
danger of war, by focusing on nuclear weapons, but that it has underestimated it, by
dissociating the issue of nuclear weapons from the broader social context in which the
arms race takes place.14
The salience of east-west conflict
Of equal importance in the debate on the new cold war is the question of the east-
west conflict and the salience it has in international relations as a whole. Kubalkova
and Cruickshank are quick to identify closet Soviet apologists here. They do this not
only by misrepresenting what the writers in question say, but also by taking
arguments out of context. This is more than just a 'rediscovery of America', a restate-
ment of the obvious, as our authors suggest.15 The context in which a number of
writers, myself included, lay a special stress on the east-west conflict is one in which
others have denied its relevance. The focus on the arms race and on the issue of peace
leads, in many cases, to a reluctance, or absolute refusal, to admit the salience of the
east-west conflict itself. Thus Kaldor and Frank locate the origins of the Second
Cold War itself in the conflicts within the western economies and, in a parallel way,
within those of the east. Chomsky sees the difficulties as lying in the difficulties both
the United States and the Soviet Union have in disciplining their respective spheres.16
Alan Wolfe locates the dynamic within US domestic politics.17 Others see the main
problem as being in the third world. All see the Soviet-US and broader east-west
conflicts as secondary or as a mere charade, designed to mask the real contradictions,
within the two power.blocs.
This is a position that appears to have much to recommend it. The arms race, and
the cold war generally, do serve functions other than that of confronting the apparent
enemy. It may be easier for the Soviet, leadership to discipline its own population if
tension is higher. The rise of cold war militancy in the United States in the late 1970s
was, in part, a reflection of domestic conflicts and tensions, and of frustrations that
had nothing to do with the USSR-—OPEC, Japanese imports, the Iranian hostage
crisis. But what I and the others who dissented from this view sought to do was to
reestablish, in however qualified a way, the relevance of the Soviet-US conflict itself
and of the ideological and systemic clashes involved. In so doing, of course, we ran
the risk of appearing to confirm what the proponents of either side were themselves
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saying. Some critics therefore accused us of merely repeating US cold war rhetoric,
because we saw the USSR and its policies as contributing to the cold war. Kubalkova
and Cruickshank chose to take the other tack. In both cases, however, the analytic
issues are obscured by polemic The key issue is not how close the 'east-west' writers
like myself are to established political stances, but how valid on independent criteria
the positions are. Kubalkova and Cruickshank seem not to regard this question as
worth their attention.
A presumption of primacy
This simplification of the substantive issues debated in the literature on the New Cold
War is underpinned by a further simplification, that of methodology and approach.
In essence, this consists of a misleading account of how the intersection of Inter-
national Relations and Marxism came about. At various points in their article,
Kubalkova and Cruickshank argue that Marxism has, in recent years, come to deal
with a set of issues that were previously the reserved domain of International
Relations. While they are, on certain conditions, in favour of a dialogue between the
two approaches, their position is one that accords historical and, by implication,
conceptual primacy to International Relations. The 'revisionists' are, they say,
inexpert in the field'. One can, however, argue the reverse: namely that International
Relations as an intellectual discipline had developed in isolation from a compre-
hensive theoretical system that predates it and which has established prior positions
on much of the terrain which International Relations aspires to develop. It is not
Marxism that has entered the field of International Relations, but the other way
around. Once again, this is not merely a matter of antiquarian or terminological
concern.
The two major contributions of Marxism to the theory of inter-state and, more
broadly, international relations were made well before the first chairs in international
relations were ever established. The one was in Marx's own work, namely the
assertion of the international character of the economy and of the distinctive social,
in this case, capitalist character thereof.18 So much of subsequent theorization about
the international system, its history, workings and development, has ignored this
central assertion of Marx's. The 'system' as it developed cannot be understood by
empty political or sub-mathematical formulas, since these abstract the system from
the social character that determined its growth and formation. Similarly, this system
was established by capitalist states, not 'states' in abstraction from their socio-
economic context as International Relations literature suggests. It is not surprising
that some of the most illuminating writings on the international system should have
come not from mainline International Relations writers, or from those who deploy
the post-imperialist euphemism of the 'western system', but from historical socio-
logists who, while often critical of Marxism, are not afraid to use the term capitalism
and to see in it a key to comprehending the pattern of international relations in this
and earlier centuries.19
The second major contribution arose in the two decades prior to World War I and
centred on the issue of imperialism.20 The import of this debate has, in retrospect,
been reduced to that of being one about the relations of metropolitan to colonized
countries, about underdevelopment and what, in today's parlance, the 'North' did to
the 'South'. As such the literature of that period tells us very little: Hobson, Lenin,
Luxemburg, Hilferding and the others were not primarily interested in under-
development, and subsequent work, empirical and theoretical, has superseded them.
Their theorization of colonialism has been justly refuted, by Marxist and non-
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Marxist alike.21 But the core question posed in this debate, one of the most
sophisticated on the nature of the international system to have taken place in modern
political thought, was of a different kind, and was concerned with the developed
industrialized countries. It was an attempt to theorize the relationship between socio-
political system, arms production and the expansion of the international economy
and at the same time to theorize the politico-economic character of international
hierarchy, beyond mere assertions about unequal power. These issues lay at the heart
of the debate on imperialism: Lenin's work was above all an attempt to conceptualize
the origins of the First World War and to draw practical conclusions from it. The
siren of prediction is one that may be avoided by all engaged in social science. But
those concerned with this could hardly find a more accurate presentiment than that of
Lenin, whose argument was that the war that began in 1914, a product of the
development of capitalism, would itself provide a fissure in the capitalist system and
lead to social revolution. A year after he had formulated his theory of imperialism,
Russia, the 'weakest link' in the chain, broke.
It is here that the place and relevance of the recent debate on the New Cold War
comes into focus. Far from being a belated intervention on the terrain of Inter-
national Relations, it is rather a development of precisely that debate which was
conducted within liberal thought and Marxism in the period up to and during the
First World War. The triangle of concepts that the theorists of the earlier generation
sought to relate-—the internal structure of industrialized capitalist society, the arms
race and war, the international workings of the economy—is the same as that under-
lying the arguments on the New Cold War, one in which Marxists and non-Marxists
have joined. It is not that Thompson, Bahro, Mandel and the others are trespassers
on the ancestral lands of International Relations: rather, they are continuing to argue
on a terrain occupied by their forerunners, one upon which the proponents of
International Relations have more recently settled.
The 'Soviet connection'
These three areas of interpretation are important to their overall argument, but the
core of the Kubalkova and Cruickshank position would seem to revolve not around
these questions of debate and provenance, so much as around the argument that the
'revisionist5 school as a whole is colluding with Moscow covertly to defend a Soviet
point of view. Kubalkova and Cruickshank rightly point out that Soviet writing on
the international system is not discussed in the debate on the New Cold War. This is
largely true, although it ignores the engagement of western writers with unofficial
Soviet writers, as well as the ongoing dispute with the official Soviet peace
committees. It has also to be said that across the whole range of contemporary
Marxist debate in the West there is little or no attempt to take Soviet writing
seriously, some branches of history and linguistics being partial exceptions. But this
failing is a flimsy base indeed upon which to erect the full charge of pro-Soviet
apologia that Kubalkova and Cruickshank want to construct. In their most succinct
section on this Kubalklova and Cruickshank reveal what they see as the intent behind
the debate on the New Cold War: 'The clear intentions of the Western Left are: (1) to
avoid identification with and approbation of the Soviet (domestic) model as the
future model for other 'anti-systemic forces'; (2) to avoid identification with the
Soviet's own Marxist-Leninist theory of 'correlation of forces' as an explanatory
model of world politics; and (3) to avoid identification with those Soviet foreign
policy objectives that are aimed at an explicit tilting of the US-USSR strategic
balance and at weakening the imperialist defence system.'22
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It is not difficult to show that this approach is spurious and ill-intentioned. It rests
first upon a declaration of what the 'intentions of the Western Left' are supposed to
be, as if some conspiracy has been revealed. No evidence of these 'intentions' is
produced. Secondly, it rests upon an equally tired trope, namely the fallacy of the
undivided middle. The fact that on some issues Soviet and western Marxist writers
share similar positions proves nothing about the relation between them. No doubt
most agree that the earth is round, that nuclear weapons are dangerous, that peace is
desirable, and so on. One could equally show that much of the western Marxist
writing shares similar positions on some questions to cold war writers in the United
States. Pro-Soviet reviewers of my work on the New Cold War proceeded very much
in the Kubalkova-Cruickshank mould, charging me with 'anti-Soviet' slanders.23
The relevant question is not whether there is coincidence on some issues, but rather
whether, overall, the conceptual and political positions are similar. Here Kubalkova
and Cruickshank can reach their conclusions only by ignoring those aspects of the
analysis, political and theoretical, that diverge markedly from the Soviet view. They
purport to take these into account but this seems little more than a feint: indeed, in
the best traditions of the vigilantist, they imply that differences with the Soviet view
only mislead, and serve to conceal a deeper agreement Had they themselves taken
adequate account of what Soviet writers say about the 'revisionists' they would have
come to a rather different conclusion.
Kubalkova and Cruickshank are equally alarmed by the way in which the
'revisionists' handle certain more empirical issues: the latter portray the Soviet Union
as the weaker partner in the west-east conflict, and refuse to accept a conventional
view of Soviet 'expansionism5. This, they say, puts into question 'the whole integrity
of the Left analysis'.24 They argue that the criteria used by 'revisionists' to compare
Soviet and western strengths prejudice the comparison and, falsely, present the
United States as stronger. Yet they do not themselves engage on the terrain of the
'revisionists', namely an attempt to use available data to compare the strengths of the
two camps. That many of our arguments are similar to those of conventional writers
such as George Kennan means little to Kubalkova and Cruickshank. It is as if, in their
view, data are irrelevant.25 Yet some empirical referents are essential in any computa-
tion of the strategic and economic capacities of the two blocs. Kubalkova and
Cruickshank concentrate only on the criteria used, and in so doing distort the
argument. In reply to my argument that the West is economically far stronger than
the Soviet Union, they say that consumer levels are irrelevant in wartime: but they
ignore the real argument, which was that in the peacetime competition of the bloc
consumer levels do play a role, in making the American way of life more attractive on
a world scale. Here is, of course, one of the places where it would be uncomfortable
for Kubalkova and Cruickshank to cite Soviet sources too closely since it is one of the
proud boasts of the Russians that they have reached some sort of military 'parity'
with the United States. The rather detailed refutation of this by western Marxists and
other New Cold War writers, as of western assertions about Soviet 'superiority', is
not something that Soviet writers would be allowed to tell their audiences.
All in all there is much that remains to be argued about the relative strengths of the
two blocs, and about the conceptual evaluations and empirical data to be used.
Similarly, the degree to which the USSR was responsible for the end of detente is
something that can be debated by reference to facts; but the method used on both
questions by Kubalkova and Cruickshank is not to engage in these arguments, so
much as to imply that those who even try to argue about them seriously, avoiding the
rhetoric about 'Soviet threat' and 'rough parity' put about by the two main camps,
are themselves colluding with the Russians. The essence of vigilantism is not to
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defend a particular position, but to deny the legitimacy of discussing it in the first
place. Claims about Soviet strategic 'superiority5 and about Soviet 'expansionism'
have been common currency, and virtually unchallenged, in most western academic
and journalistic writing, for the past decade or so. What Kubalkova and Cruickshank
seem to argue is that the very disputing of these ideas is impermissible.
In line with their selective use of available sources, and their rather ideological
approach to empirical questions, Kubalkova and Cruickshank make great play of
what they see as the 'inexpert' nature of the Left's writings on the USSR. The claim
made is, indeed, that were the 'Left5 to acquaint itself further with the professional
writings on the Soviet Union it would not be able to argue as it does. This curious line
of argument is itself sustainable only by ignoring the substantial body of literature,
within Soviet studies, that does precisely open up the possibilities of an alternative
analysis of Soviet foreign and military policy. In the field of history, one need only
mention the works of E. H. Carr, Robert Davies, Jonathan Haslam and, earlier,
Issac Deutscher. In the field of contemporary studies the works of David Holloway
and Stephen Shenfield on Soviet military policy, and Jonathan Steele on foreign
policy are notable.26 Most significant of all, because their names are never mentioned
by Kubalkova and Cruickshank, to whom their presence in the debate must be most
unwelcome, are the two independent Soviet writers Zhores and Roy Medvedev.27 We
are not told if these writers, whose professional credentials are second to none, are
also to be taxed by our authors with the charges of sethnocentrismJ and 'blindspots'
so easily marshalled on their final page. A more attentive reading of 'critical5 Soviet-
ologists-by Kubalkova and Cruickshank might tell them a thing or two.
Conclusion
The growing intersection of Marxism and International Relations is a product not
only of a greater participation by Marxists in debates on international relations, but
also of a broader revival of interest in western Marxism across the wide range of
social sciences that has been in train since the 1960s. If anything, International
Relations has remained relatively exempt from Marxist influence longer than other
disciplines, and its issues were relatively absent from the 'critiques' and 'alternatives'
that emerged from the intellectual and academic upheavals of two decades ago.28
During the 1970s Marxism did find some recognition in International Relations, but in
a specific, delimited, context which restricted its theoretical scope and was presented in
a partial fashion, namely dependency theory.29 Later, Marxism came to play a larger
role in the revival of international political economy where it was both taken
seriously and subjected to careful criticism.30
The situation in the 1980s, however, is one that has gone beyond these initial inter-
sections. It opens up the possibility of a more comprehensive application to Inter-
national Relations of the theoretical developments within Marxism that have
accompanied the revival of western Marxism, and, simultaneously, a questioning of
Marxism in the light of the issues posed by International Relations. The central
terrain of International Relations has been that of the state and of conflict between
states, and it is here that many of the most interesting debates and challenges may be
found. For its part, recent Marxist theory has posed again the question of the state,
not by saying that the state is depassed or irrelevant, but rather by trying to re-
conceptualize the state itself. If classes operate on an international scale, and if
economic processes are transnational, these none the less operate through states, and
through the restructuring and inflecting of states to meet current needs. The state
remains the focus of political, economic and social power even as the origins and
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scope of that power change. It is here, as much as anywhere, that the point of a
fruitful and mutually beneficial debate involving International Relations, as an
academic discipline, and Marxism may be found.31
The debate on the New Cold War is part of this overall Marxist revival although
many of those who have participated in it are not in any strict sense Marxists. But the
importance of the New Cold War argument lies precisely in the way that its
theoretical assumptions, and the substantive issues of analysis that it raises, are ones
that are of concern to both International Relations and Marxist theory more
generally. The reception of the New Cold War literature by Kubalkova and Cruick-
shank is, in this sense, inapposite and misleading. It misrepresents the issues around
which the New Cold War debate has revolved. It ignores the historical continuity
between this debate and earlier Marxist debates. Most important of all, it presses the
New Cold War literature into a distorting, Old Cold War, framework by presenting
the New Cold War writers as apologists. We are used to the imposition of such
conformist discipline in the eastern bloc. It is regrettable to see the same reflexes, and
practices, transposed with such apparent ease to the west. Western Marxism has a
history that long predates, and is independent of, the orthodoxies of Soviet
officialdom, as much as it has dissented from the conventional wisdoms of the
academies of the West. Its recent involvement with the debates of International
Relations is a welcome development, the full promise of which is far from being
realized, and is something from which both International Relations and Marxism
can, with due modesty and perseverance, draw some benefit.
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